Making the Most of EU Labour Mobility. Report of a CEPS Task Force in Cooperation with the Bertelsmann Foundation. CEPS Task Force Report, 7 October 2014 by Van der Pas, Nikolaus et al.
 Making the Most 
of EU Labour Mobility 
 
Report of a CEPS Task Force 
 
 
 Rapporteurs: Mikkel Barslund 
 and Matthias Busse 
   
 
 
 
MAKING THE MOST 
OF EU LABOUR MOBILITY 
 
 
REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE  
IN COOPERATION WITH THE BERTELSMANN FOUNDATION 
 
OCTOBER 2014 
 
 
CHAIRMAN: NIKOLAUS VAN DER PAS 
Former Director General, DG Employment and Social 
Affairs  
 
RAPPORTEURS: MIKKEL BARSLUND 
Research Fellow, CEPS 
 
MATTHIAS BUSSE 
Researcher, CEPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES 
BRUSSELS  
  
 
This report is based on discussions of the CEPS Task Force on “Intra-EU Mobility”, which 
met three times between 16th December 2013 and the 12th March 2014. The Task Force was 
made possible with the financial support of the Confederation of Danish Employers and the 
Bertelsmann Foundation. In addition the Task Force received financial support from the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbände, the VNO-NCW/MKB-Nederland and the Volkswagen AG. The Task 
Force furthermore benefited from the participation of the European Investment Bank, Robert 
Bosch GmbH, the European Round Table of Industrialists, Assonime, the European 
Commission, the Committee of the Regions, the European University Institute, the Spanish 
Youth Council, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce Südthüringen, the Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit, Nestlé and Minor Projektkontor für Bildung und Forschung e.V.  
The Task Force Report is based on original research and draws upon the existing 
literature. The contents of the report reflect the general tone and direction of the discussions, 
but for example the recommendations do not necessarily represent a full common position 
agreed by all members of the Task Force, nor do they necessarily represent the views of CEPS 
or the institutions to which the members belong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-94-6138-407-2 
© Copyright 2014, Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any 
form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise – without the prior permission 
of the Centre for European Policy Studies. 
Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 
E-mail: info@ceps.eu 
Website: http://www.ceps.eu  
   
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Preface ....................................................................................................................................... 1 
Executive Summary: Findings and Recommendations ........................................................ 3 
I. Labour Mobility and the Effect of the Crisis ............................................................... 5 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 5 
2. Intra-EU mobility before the crisis ............................................................................ 6 
2.1 Intra-EU15 ........................................................................................................ 6 
2.2 East-west mobility ............................................................................................ 8 
3. The impact of the crisis ............................................................................................ 10 
3.1 East-west mobility .......................................................................................... 10 
3.2 South-north mobility ...................................................................................... 11 
3.3 German destination ........................................................................................ 12 
3.4 The UK ........................................................................................................... 13 
3.5 Other northern destinations ............................................................................ 14 
4. Emigration to third countries .................................................................................. 14 
5. Limited stabilisation effect ....................................................................................... 15 
6. Conclusions.............................................................................................................. 15 
7. Recommendation: The need for better data ............................................................. 15 
II. The Case for Free Movement ...................................................................................... 17 
1. The scope ................................................................................................................. 17 
2. The economics ......................................................................................................... 17 
2.1 Uncertainties ................................................................................................... 17 
2.2 Benefits at EU level ........................................................................................ 18 
2.3 Effects at member state level ......................................................................... 18 
3. Moving for welfare benefits? ................................................................................... 19 
3.1 Social security coordination ........................................................................... 20 
3.2 Social assistance to economically inactive EU citizens ................................. 21 
3.3 Conclusions and recommendations ................................................................ 21 
III. How to Promote Labour Mobility ............................................................................... 23 
1. EURES: Better matching and information .............................................................. 23 
2. Recognition of professional qualifications .............................................................. 24 
3. Portability of supplementary pension entitlements.................................................. 26 
4. Language ................................................................................................................. 27 
5. Third-country nationals ........................................................................................... 27 
5.1 Rules guiding the intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals .................... 29 
6. Findings and recommendations ............................................................................... 30 
IV. The German Experiment ............................................................................................. 32 
1. Local and regional projects ..................................................................................... 32 
2. National support schemes ........................................................................................ 34 
  
 
3. What role for the EU? .............................................................................................. 36 
4. Findings and recommendations ............................................................................... 36 
V. Overview: Findings and Recommendations ............................................................... 37 
References ............................................................................................................................... 39 
Appendix. List of Participants in the CEPS Task Force and Invited Speakers ............... 46 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1. Spanish emigration to Germany and Spanish immigration from Germany, 
as a % of the Spanish population, 1960-2012 ............................................................ 5 
Figures 2a and b. Emigrants from EU15 within and outside other EU15 countries 
as % of population ...................................................................................................... 7 
Figure 3. Unemployment convergence in the EU15, in % ......................................................... 7 
Figure 4. GDP per capita in EURO and PPS, 2008, EU=100 .................................................... 8 
Figure 5. Unemployment convergence in the EU ...................................................................... 9 
Figure 6. Annual change in stock of reporting countries’ citizens in the EU15, 
in % of reporting countries’ population ..................................................................... 9 
Figure 7. Population of EU10 nationals in reporting country 2008 (in thousands) ................. 10 
Figure 8. Population of EU10 nationals in reporting country 2012 (in thousands) ................. 11 
Figures 9a and b. New incentives (unemployment rate and economic growth) ...................... 11 
Figure 10. Net migration as % of population by broad citizenship, 2012 ................................ 12 
Figures 11a and b. Migration to Germany ............................................................................... 13 
Figures 12a and b. GIPS mobile worker emigration to Germany and the UK ........................ 13 
Figures 13a and b. GIPS emigration to smaller northern EU countries ................................... 14 
Figure 14. Immigration to EU15 by country of citizenship, 2010 ........................................... 28 
 
Table 1. Recognition performance between 2010-2013 by country where 
qualification was obtained (only application within the EU) .................................... 25 
Table 2. EU and third country nationals living in the EU outside their country of birth ......... 28 
 
 
Making the Most of EU Labour Mobility 
1 
Preface 
Six years on from the beginning of the financial crisis, economic conditions could hardly be 
more different around the eurozone. Germany, the EU’s largest labour market, struggles to 
meet demand for workers in a variety of professions and has launched several campaigns to 
attract foreign jobseekers from inside and outside the EU. 
At the same time, more than 25% of Spain’s active population is unemployed and this has 
been the case for over four years. Economic forecasts predict only minimal improvement in 
the years to come, even if the worst of the crisis seems behind us. The situation is no better in 
Greece, and only somewhat less gloomy in Portugal and Italy.  
The history of this malaise is well known; what started out as a financial crisis for most EU 
member states in 2008 turned into a debt crisis that hit southern EU countries harder than 
others. With monetary policy tied to the eurozone and no fiscal room for manoeuvre, they 
could not avert mass unemployment. 
Why have more southern Europeans not escaped unemployment by using one of the best-
known and popular rights of EU membership: the right to free movement for EU citizens? 
Why are not many more Spaniards working in Germany? Is it simply the language barrier or 
are other obstacles blocking the way?  
The Task Force’s discussions reflected the general conviction that labour mobility, together 
with the free movement of goods, services and capital, remains an essential tool for achieving 
the EU’s ambitions, internally and globally. A dynamic labour market less impaired by 
national boundaries, where labour and skills are allocated more efficiently, is important for 
companies’ ability to grow and invest, not least in light of the increasing competition from 
other world regions. It is also important for maintaining sound public finances in times of 
fiscal restraint and increasing demographic pressure. 
Less than 3% of EU citizens reside in a country other than their own. Annual mobility flows 
do not exceed 0.3% – one-tenth of the USA figure. More needs to be done to develop the full 
potential of mobility.  
The public debate shows the limits of what is possible, however, especially during crises and 
recessions. Opposition has grown in several member states, targeting mobility from low-
income eastern Europe, with accusations and suspicions about unfair wage competition, 
bogus self-employment and illegal work. This probably has more to do with the posting of 
workers (which we do not cover in this report) rather than independently mobile workers.  
Labour market illegality and fraudulent claims are not specific to any particular country, or 
group of countries, and must be tackled by national authorities, in close cooperation with their 
counterparts abroad. But this response does not address objections to provisions in EU 
legislation that are seen as favouring improper practices. It would be unwise to dismiss such 
objections. Even when they come without evidence, as is the case for ‘benefit tourism’, they 
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should be examined with the utmost care. Widespread anxiety should indeed not be ignored, 
lest it undermine the very idea of free movement. 
Jean-Claude Juncker, President-elect of the European Commission, was therefore right when, 
in addressing the European Parliament in Strasbourg in July (“Political Guidelines for the 
next European Commission”), he said that labour mobility should be promoted. At the same 
time, however, he stressed the need to fight abuse and fraudulent claims.  
This report undertakes a broader analysis of labour mobility: the facts, the economics, the 
barriers and the German labour mobility experiment. 
Mikkel Barslund 
Matthias Busse 
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Executive Summary: Findings and Recommendations 
Mobile workers in the EU face greater obstacles than citizens moving between states in the 
US and this situation is unlikely to change. This Task Force report aims to determine mobility 
patterns, to identify barriers and to propose policy measures and instruments for the EU to 
facilitate labour mobility. The EU needs to develop appropriate policies to make the most of 
its mobility potential. 
This report combines the most recent data from Eurostat with national sources to highlight the 
most significant labour mobility trends within the EU. Comparisons between regions, western 
Europe (EU15) and eastern Europe (EU10) and over time, pre- and post-crisis, can be used to 
assess the impact of the economic and financial crisis on mobility flows.  
Overall, the recent recession has not induced previously immobile workers to become more 
mobile, at least not in the larger member states. Mobility flows have moved away from crisis 
countries in response to the economic downturn but the desired increase in south-north 
mobility has not been observed so far. This leads us to conclude that successfully fostering 
mobility within EU15 countries requires tremendous effort. It is thus all the more important 
that those workers who are willing and able to move are not discouraged from doing so by 
unnecessary barriers to mobility. Improving the workings of the EURES system and its online 
job-matching platform, better cooperation of national employment agencies, streamlining the 
recognition of qualifications and supporting language training within the EU are important 
contributions to labour mobility.  
Workers from EU10 countries are comparatively mobile. And they have moved to EU15 
countries in greater numbers than expected. Studies show that their direct economic 
contribution is positive, although small. The fact remains that both with respect to numbers of 
people moving and economic impact, east-west mobility ought to be of little overall concern. 
Nevertheless, media coverage and fears of a massive influx of ‘foreign’ EU workers add up to 
a potential threat to the free movement of workers.  
The EU is right to take a strong stance in defending the free movement of workers. National 
governments should keep in mind that their ability to tap into an attractive foreign labour 
supply also hinges upon the perception of how mobile workers are treated in destination 
countries. If the political imperative requires regulations to be changed, such as the one 
guiding the coordination of social security, it is essential that no new mobility barriers are 
erected. 
Although the main findings of our analysis are clear, there is a need for timelier and better 
data on mobility within the Union. This is not only true for headline-grabbing statistics, but 
also to glean more detailed information about mobile workers; how they fare in destination 
countries and their short- and long-run impact on both destination and sending countries. For 
this purpose a Mobility Working Group should be set up, with the participation of relevant 
national ministries, most preferably within the existing institutional structures.   
* 
Mikkel Barslund & Matthias Busse 
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In recent years Germany has adopted a more direct approach to fostering labour mobility, 
focusing on the south of Europe. The locally and regionally anchored projects connect 
domestic employers, who are unable to fill vacancies with local labour input, and jobseekers 
abroad. The attractiveness for the jobseeker lies in the considerable guidance and financial 
support provided to move, while the employer is able to minimise related risks. German 
public funding has been made available for such projects, because recruitment costs are 
considerable. Projects have been popular with both employers and foreign employees, with 
the result that available funds have been exhausted quickly. It is too early to say whether this 
investment will pay off and whether the approach could be scaled up.  
Important lessons can nevertheless be learned from efforts and policies aimed at fostering 
intra-EU mobility, both at national level and EU level. The EU’s demographic outlook is 
bleak so a better allocation of the labour force within the EU, even if it were to be greatly 
improved, could only counter this phenomenon to a limited extent. In the near future policies 
are needed to increase the attractiveness of the EU to foreign talent. Failure to do so will 
impact on economic growth, jobs and prosperity for all EU member states. Experiments with 
new policy tools, detailed analysis of mobility motivations and effective responses to dealing 
with the negative public perception of foreign workers are essential for the EU to remain 
globally competitive in the future. 
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I. Labour Mobility and the Effect of the Crisis 
1. Introduction 
EU mobility is low. Less than 3% of EU citizens reside in an EU country other than their 
own. Compared to other nationalities, Europeans apparently need strong incentives to seek 
employment abroad. 
At times, even before the creation of the EU, there were such incentives: escape from 
economic hardship and dictatorships in Greece, Portugal and Spain. Tens of thousands of 
Italians fled unemployment to work in Belgian mines during the first half of the last century. 
An estimated 10% of Greeks left their country between 1955 and 1973 (Karakatsanis and 
Swarts, 2003). Portuguese emigration almost reached 1.4 million (equal to 12% of the 
population) from 1950 to 1988. From the 1960s until the early 1970s, around 100,000 foreign 
workers sought employment in Germany, Switzerland and France each year. North-western 
European economies were booming in the 1960s, so absorption of these migrants created few 
problems, especially when the movements were temporary, as was the case for Spanish 
migrants to Germany (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Spanish emigration to Germany and Spanish immigration from Germany, as a % of 
the Spanish population, 1960-2012 
 
Source: Instituto Federal de Estadística, (2013). 
Once Spain became politically and economically stable, mobility abated sharply and no 
resurgence was recorded, even when transitional restrictions were lifted in 1993, some years 
after Spain’s accession to the EU in 1986. Portugal, which joined the EU at the same time, 
followed a similar trajectory.  
Overall, mobility remained low. Between 2001 and 2010, US annual mobility flows 
stood at around 3% and were even higher for the 18-24 age group (Molloy et al., 2011). More 
than half of the mobile persons there moved not merely into a neighbouring state but over 
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longer distances. The EU has an annual flow of no more than 0.3% of its population – one-
tenth of the corresponding US figure (European Commission, 2013a). The large difference is 
presumably due to lower linguistic and cultural barriers within the US, which is unlikely to 
change, despite the recent proliferation of English within the EU.  
The increasing importance of labour mobility has been highlighted in the context of the 
eurozone. As indicated in the Delors report of 1989 (Delors, 1989), a monetary union requires 
a shock-absorption capacity, including increased labour mobility to even out divergences 
(Mundell, 1961 and De Grauwe, 2000). But it was fear of excessive mobility that pushed 
mobility to the top of the agenda after the EU’s enlargement in 2004 and 2007, perhaps best 
illustrated by the ‘Polish plumber’ debate in France. Fears were exacerbated by the financial 
crisis from 2008 on, leading to the portrayal of mobility as a threat and causing a surge of 
anti-immigration sentiment in several EU member states, especially when mobility 
restrictions for Romania and Bulgaria were lifted in 2014. Mobility became a hot political 
issue, including in the election campaigns to the European Parliament in May 2014.  
Enlargement did indeed increase mobility. Overall, the number of EU citizens residing 
in another EU country rose from 1.6% in 2004 to 2.8% by the end of 2012, largely driven by 
the eastern enlargement (European Commission, 2013a). Today, two labour mobility flows 
can be observed: one from the south to the north, primarily driven by employment 
divergences, and another from the east to the west, driven more by income differences. The 
former is by far smaller than the latter. Both flows contribute, albeit in small magnitude, to 
rebalancing and convergence in the EU. However, they provoke differing reactions and it is 
therefore necessary to look beyond the overall EU mobility figure to examine flows in more 
detail.  
2. Intra-EU mobility before the crisis 
For the purpose of this report, we divide the EU into two major regions that exhibit common 
characteristics: the old member states (EU15) and the new member states (EU10)
1,2
  
2.1 Intra-EU15 
In 2009 the stock of EU15 migrants in other EU15 countries than their own made up merely 
1.8% of the EU15 population. Among the sending countries, Portugal and Ireland stand out 
with around 10% of their population living in other EU15 countries (Figure 2).  
At the receiving end, none of the bigger countries has a stock above 2%; their average 
is even below 1.5%. Belgium, which hosts the NATO headquarters and the European 
institutions, and Ireland have most foreign EU15 nationals as a percentage of their domestic 
populations. Italy and Portugal are at the lower end of the range with less than 1% of their 
populations being citizens of another EU15 country. 
                                                 
1
 EU10 is defined as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, the Slovak Republic. 
2
 See: Commission 2013, Holland et al., 2011 and Bonin, H. et al. (2008). 
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Figures 2a and b. Emigrants from EU15 within and outside other EU15 countries as % of 
population 
Figure 2a. Stock of expatriates by country of 
birth within the EU15 and outside of the EU15, 
in % of the country of birth’s population, 2006 
Figure 2b. EU15 stock within the reporting 
country as % of reporting country’s 
population, 2009 
  
Note: Figure 2b does not include France, due to lack of data. Stocks exclude reporting country nationals. Data 
from 2009 was chosen since no country data is available on Eurostat before 2009. 
Sources: Eurostat data and DIOC database (OECD). 
The annual flow, as distinct from stocks, of EU15 citizens moving to another EU15 
state, was estimated at 400,000 in 2009, which represents only 0.1% of its population. This 
figure was roughly constant in the period 2002 to 2012. Income differences within EU15 
(Figure 4) – a key driver of labour mobility (Mansoor and Quillin, 2007), was not sufficient to 
trigger higher flows among the EU15. The differences between the highest and the lowest 
income levels: the Irish average income was 2.6 times higher than the Portuguese, is 
historically and comparatively low. In addition, the pre-crisis decade witnessed a degree of 
convergence in unemployment (Figure 3). Spain, Ireland and Italy managed to halve their 
high unemployment rates within ten years.  
Figure 3. Unemployment convergence in the EU15, in % 
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Source: Ameco (2014). 
Both main incentives to move: higher income abroad and better employment 
opportunities, were therefore subdued, to some extent explaining the persistently low intra-
EU15 mobility prior to the crisis. 
2.2 East-west mobility3 
The EU10 joined in 2004 and 2007, increasing the EU population by some 120 million with 
new mobility potential. Fearing a massive inflow of EU10 nationals, triggered by the large 
income gap between the two regions (see Figure 4), most EU15 introduced transition periods 
that postponed the freedom of movement; these mostly expired in 2008 but were maintained 
until 2014 for Romania and Bulgaria.  
Income differences were indeed considerable. The gap in 2008 between Poland (the 
lowest within the EU8)
4
 and the wealthiest EU15
5
 stood at 4.5 and at 2.4 in PPS. If we 
include Romania and Bulgaria, the differences in PPS reach 9.2 and 3.1.  
Figure 4. GDP per capita in EURO and PPS, 2008, EU=100 
 
Source: Eurostat (2014). 
Disparities in employment rates around the time of accession may also have acted as a 
driver for mobility. Unemployment increased between 1997 and 2002 but then dropped below 
the 1997 levels (Figure 5). In 2007 the unemployment rate in most EU10 countries was lower 
than in the EU15.  
                                                 
3
 This section does not address mobility from the EU15 to the EU10. With slightly more than 100,000 EU15 
citizens residing in the EU10 (in 2009), this is not a phenomenon that raises particular questions. This is not 
surprising given the large income gap and few other pull factors. 
4
 EU8: The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. 
5
 Luxembourg excluded. 
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Figure 5. Unemployment convergence in the EU 
 
Source: Ameco (2014). 
Figure 6, below, shows the impact of the eastern enlargement. Poland and Latvia saw 
more than 0.5% of their domestic population move to the EU15 annually, Lithuania 1%; 
Bulgaria reached 0.7% and Romania almost 1.5% – both massive figures given that 
restrictions were not lifted until 2014. Over the period 2000 to 2008 as many as 7.5% and 5% 
left Romania and Latvia, respectively. The country with the smallest outflow for which data is 
available for the full period was Slovenia, with 0.3%.  
Figure 6. Annual change in stock of reporting countries’ citizens in the EU15, in % of 
reporting countries’ population 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat, national statistical offices and Holland et al. (2011). 
The most popular destination was Spain, with over 1 million in EU10 stocks (Figure 7). 
This can partly be explained by Spain’s historically low unemployment rates and overall 
booming economy with a flourishing construction sector that offered ample opportunities for 
all skill levels. Other top destinations were Italy, the UK and Germany, each with more than 
750,000 immigrant workers. Data are not available for France and Greece but it can be 
assumed that France was also one of the major destinations.  
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EU10 citizens had different preferences for EU15 destinations. Poles mainly sought 
opportunities in the UK and Germany (accounting for roughly two-thirds of all emigration to 
the EU15) while Romanians almost exclusively targeted Italy and Spain before the crisis hit 
these two countries.  
Figure 7. Population of EU10 nationals in reporting country 2008 (in thousands)  
 
Note: Charts do not include France and Greece due to lack of data. 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat, national statistical offices and Holland et al. (2011). 
In conclusion, prior to the economic crisis, a net average of 1% of the EU10 population 
left their home countries each year. South-north mobility was relatively low, but so were 
incentives to move. This changed with the emergence of the financial crisis and the resulting 
debt crisis. 
3. The impact of the crisis 
3.1 East-west mobility 
With the onset of recession in most western European countries, opportunities for foreign 
workers declined, particularly in the collapsing construction sector. Just as the boom attracted 
many EU10 citizens to the EU15 in the four years before the crisis, the bust triggered a 
reversal in the size of net outflow from EU10 countries (Figure 6). The exceptions are Estonia 
and Latvia, which themselves experienced severe recessions with powerful push factors. The 
flow of Romanians, Bulgarians, Lithuanians and Polish citizens to EU15 diminished sharply.  
In terms of economic rebalancing, this was a normal, even desirable response to the 
crisis. It limited the growth of unemployment in the periphery relative to a situation of 
unaltered flows. One option for mobile workers is to return to their home country, another is 
to target a country with more opportunities. As Figure 8 shows, EU10 citizens remained 
highly mobile and their stock in the EU15 remained high. More than a million citizens from 
EU10 countries lived in the UK, Italy, Germany, and even Spain, in 2012. 
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Figure 8. Population of EU10 nationals in reporting country 2012 (in thousands)  
 
Note: Charts do not include France and Greece due to lack of data. 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat, national statistical offices and Holland et al. (2011). 
 
3.2 South-north mobility 
In 2012, GDP per capita in Greece had dropped by 21% since 2007 and in Spain by almost 
7%. The unemployment rate in both countries crossed the threshold of 25% (Figures 9, a & b) 
with over half of its active young (15-24 years) population being unemployed. Rising 
unemployment rates may not be a sufficient push factor if they are perceived to be temporary. 
But the IMF expects a gradual reduction of Greek unemployment to last up to 2018, and 
virtually no change for Spain. Similarly, IMF forecasts show real positive economic growth 
only from 2014 for the GIPS (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), but these have been over-
optimistic in previous years. (Mody, 2014).  
Figures 9a and b. New incentives (unemployment rate and economic growth) 
Figure 9a. Unemployment rate Figure 9b. GDP growth 
  
Source: Ameco, 2014 and IMF (2014). 
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These new incentives did impact net migration from the GIPS where net immigration 
before the crisis turned to net emigration. In 2012 all GIPS and Ireland witnessed a net 
outflow of its citizens. In the small economies of Ireland, Greece and Portugal around 0.5% of 
the population left the country (Figure 10). However, in the heavy-weights Italy and Spain 
little net emigration of citizens could be observed. Combined, only 0.1% of GIPS and Irish 
citizens left their countries in 2012. In Spain net emigration has largely been driven by its 
foreign population. Between 2008 and 2012 only 0.1% of Spain’s nationals left the country, 
and in Italy and Greece the figure is 0.2%.
6
 For Portugal and Ireland the numbers are higher, 
at 0.7% and 1.2%, respectively. 
Figure 10. Net migration as % of population by broad citizenship, 2012 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
In the last two years emigration from the GIPS and Ireland has increased. 
Unfortunately, harmonised Eurostat data for 2012 is not yet available, but national sources 
provide data for 2013. 
3.3 German destination 
Work opportunities in Germany greatly increased after 2010. Its unemployment rate had 
fallen to the lowest figure in decades; at around 6% it was similar to that of the Netherlands 
and Austria. The economy grew, new jobs were created and domestic labour was less 
available. Germany’s negative demographic outlook was another reason for a greater 
willingness among employers to hire abroad. Overall, German net migration flows show a 
substantial increase, varying according to the countries of origin (Figure 11). Greece is a clear 
outlier here. Relative to its population it has overtaken all other GIPS. During the period 
2007-09, GIPS net migration to Germany was negative, moving strongly into positive figures 
and reaching 82,000 GIPS residents in 2013.
7
  
                                                 
6
 For Greece, the period covered is only 2010-12.  
7
 Excluding German citizens, but taking into account those who obtained citizenship and thus drop out of the 
statistics. 
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Figures 11a and b. Migration to Germany 
Figure 11a. Net migration to Germany, excluding 
Germans, as % of reporting country’s population 
Figure 11b. Immigration to Germany, excluding 
Germans, as % of reporting country’s 
population 
 
 
Note: 2007 and 2008 data also includes Germans. 
Source: German Statistical office 2014. 
 
3.4 The UK 
The UK
8
 is one of the most popular destinations for mobility and has increased its popularity 
in recent years (Figure 12).  
Figures 12a and b. GIPS mobile worker emigration to Germany and the UK 
Figure 12a: Change in stock of social insured 
employees by nationality in Germany, March YoY 
Figure 12a: Issuance of NINos in the UK by 
nationality 
  
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2014). Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2014). 
                                                 
8
 For the UK there is no data readily available on immigration flows by previous country of residence but the 
national insurance numbers (NINos) indicate by nationality the number of people who register for work permits 
in a given period.  
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3.5 Other northern destinations 
The remaining northern member states
9
 combined have also registered a steady increase in 
immigration from GIPS since 2010 (Figure 13).  
Figures 13a and b. GIPS emigration to smaller northern EU countries 
Figure 13a. Net migration to the small northern 
countries, as % of reporting country’ population 
Figure 13b. Immigration to the small northern 
countries, as % of reporting country’ 
population 
 
Source: National statistical offices. 
 
The data collected from statistical offices in member states covering 2013 shows a small 
increase in movements of GIPS’ nationals towards the northern EU15. However, as 
previously stated, it is from a low base. Given the time passed since the onset of the crisis and 
the fact that the German labour market has had favourable conditions for two years, there is 
little reason to expect that mobility within EU15 will change substantially as a consequence of 
the crisis.  
4. Emigration to third countries 
Emigration to third countries was driven, on the one hand, by nationals seeking employment 
opportunities abroad and by return migration on the other. Spanish emigration, for instance, 
was dominated by Romanian, Bulgarian and Latin American nationals. From Portugal, 35% 
of emigrants (nationals and non-nationals) left the EU, from Spain 61% and from Italy 47%. 
English-speaking countries such as the US, Canada or Australia were popular destinations, 
especially for Irish migrants. Spaniards and Portuguese targeted former colonies with a 
common language and networks that could facilitate social and labour integration. Fifty-two 
percent of Spanish emigrants went to South America.  
                                                 
9
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5. Limited stabilisation effect 
Mobility has provided a stabilisation effect for the worst-affected GIPS countries, but mainly 
because inflows have dried up – although not significantly reversed. The mobility of 
nationals, in particularly Spaniards and Italians, has so far had a very limited effect on overall 
economic stability. The most recent data collected would suggest that this is not set to change 
substantially.  
Based on the previous figures, a rough estimate of the number of Spanish nationals who 
left for the northern EU15 in the period 2008 to 2012 would not exceed 1% of the average 
number of people unemployed in Spain, thereby having only a negligible potential impact on 
the unemployment rate in Spain. For Italy the number is less than 4% while it is somewhat 
higher for Portugal (9%). While indicative of the stabilisation effect of mobility, these 
numbers are only approximations. Clearly, a detailed analysis of all the factors that influence 
the unemployment rates goes beyond the scope of this report.  
6. Conclusions 
Enlargement increased the number of citizens residing in countries other than their own, but 
this number remained low overall: 1.6% (EU15-2004) to 2.8% (EU27-2012). For the EU10 
alone, outflow figures to the EU15 – with a strong preference for Italy, Spain, the UK and 
Germany, and pushed by income differences – reached 1% annually, compared to a very low 
0.1% among the EU15 before enlargement. 
The crisis strongly reduced eastern EU10 annual outflow figures, sometimes by more 
than one-half. Mobile EU10 workers reoriented towards the UK, Germany and Italy. This 
phenomenon, and that of third-country nationals returning home, were the main migration 
responses to the crisis. In recent years high stocks of EU10 workers have emerged in the 
EU15; for some EU10 countries this may be a reason for concern in the long run. 
At the same time, southern EU15 (GIPS) inflow figures into other EU15 countries 
increased, with the UK and Germany figuring as main destinations. However, despite 
increasing south-north mobility, levels remained low, in particular for the large countries Italy 
and Spain. Greek, Portuguese and Irish citizens proved themselves to be more responsive to 
the crisis. 
Spikes in annual mobility flows, as the crisis unfolded, always started from a low level 
and were never anywhere near the 3% flow observed in the USA. Their effect as stabilisers 
was limited. 
7. Recommendation: The need for better data 
In spite of the excellent statistical work done by Eurostat, the research for this report showed 
that there are still many blanks on the statistical map. Approximations must often fill in for 
missing, recent and comparable statistics. Without these, European and national institutions 
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dealing with the many questions related to the labour market (social benefits, insurance, 
health and safety, etc.) cannot function efficiently. The general lack of information hampers 
the political debate and fuels unfounded fears; undermining the very idea of European 
integration. Quality, rapidity and comparability of national data and their consolidation and 
publication at EU level are essential to a better understanding of labour mobility within the 
EU. These are priorities that should be dealt with, ideally by a specific body that could be 
created: a European Mobility Working Group, or by existing formations within and between 
national and European institutions.  
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II. The Case for Free Movement 
1. The scope 
Free movement is one of the four cornerstones of the EU’s internal market. It was part of the 
original Rome Treaty in 1957, alongside the free movement of goods, services and capital. In 
addition, the Council Regulation of 1968 secured the right to equal treatment and non-
discrimination on the basis of citizenship. It also gave the right of access to workers’ family 
members.  
The European Court of Justice extended these rights throughout the 1970s and 1980s to 
cover other economic actors such as the self-employed, paid apprentices and seasonal 
workers. A number of directives in 1990 further extended free movement to non-economic 
actors (students, pensioners) subject to the requirement that they have sufficient resources so 
as not to become a burden for the host country.  
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty took this a step further with the explicit introduction of 
‘European Union citizenship’ giving all EU citizens the right to move to and reside in the 
territory of any of the member states, subject to the condition of sufficient resources 
mentioned above (Carrera, 2005; Favell and Recchi, 2009). This concept was further clarified 
in the 2004 Citizens Directive (European Council, 2004a), which codified the evolved 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. Importantly, the directive also provided for 
the equal right of treatment without conditions for EU citizens having resided for more than 
five years in another member state. The Citizens Directive is the main legislative instrument 
covering free movement today. 
Currently, free movement is about much more than the internal market. It is central to 
the notion of European citizenship and social cohesion among member states. In no way does 
this diminish the central economic importance of the free movement of labour, which remains 
essential for the fulfilment of the EU’s ambitions in a globalised economy, as laid down in the 
EU 2020 strategy.  
2. The economics  
2.1 Uncertainties 
The decision to move is a difficult one for an individual or a family to take. It is best seen as 
an investment with associated costs (e.g. loss of job, contacts with family, friends and 
networks) in exchange for uncertainty. The end result depends on a range of factors, including 
how well one integrates professionally, socially and culturally, learns the language, and, 
importantly but not exclusively, how much one earns. Uncertainties also prevail at the country 
level and further depend on whether a country is at the sending or receiving end of mobility. 
Member states still finance an important part of intergenerational redistribution via pay-as-
you-go schemes (pensions, old age care), raising the question of how long and how much 
mobile citizens will contribute to, or draw from benefits. Attempts to ascertain the cost and 
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benefits of mobility must take all these dimensions into account, distinguishing between the 
individual, the host and sending countries, and the overall EU level. The EU as a whole is a 
net beneficiary in the short and long term. The impact of mobility on individual member 
states, however, may show considerable heterogeneity.  
2.2 Benefits at EU level  
At the aggregate EU28 level, the economics of labour mobility are clear. An increase in 
labour mobility improves the allocation of resources, increases economic output and welfare 
(ECB, 2006; Kahanec, 2013; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014). Individuals who move across 
borders from unemployment into employment raise the level of economic output – 
increasingly so if they move from low- to high-productivity sectors. 
More labour mobility helps to reduce structural unemployment when labour markets 
diverge, and contributes towards the EU2020 target of a 75% employment rate. Higher overall 
employment levels are crucial to attaining sound public finances at a time of fiscal 
consolidation and longer-term challenges like demographic ageing.  
 Higher labour mobility can boost skills and entrepreneurship, spread ideas and 
knowledge and consequently foster innovation (Alesina et al, 2013). A genuinely integrated 
labour market is also attractive for highly skilled third-country nationals, even without the full 
benefit of free movement within the EU (Eisele, 2013; EMN, 2013). Their contribution will 
gain in importance as baby boomers retire and the EU population shrinks.  
2.2.1 Eurozone shock absorption 
For eurozone countries labour mobility helps to absorb asymmetric economic shocks 
(Mundell, 1961; De Grauwe, 2000), and is indispensable under fiscal policy constraints 
and/or eurozone discipline; a rise in unemployment during an economic downturn can be 
contained if workers look for jobs outside their home country or region. This helps to improve 
employment prospects for those not moving, and relieves the immediate strain on public 
expenditure (for unemployment benefits, health and social care, retraining and education). 
Remittances from mobile workers abroad also have a positive effect on both public finances 
and welfare (Kahanec et al., 2010; ECB, 2006).  
2.3 Effects at member state level 
An assessment of the costs and benefits for individual member states and citizens is more 
difficult as it depends on a number of factors, short and long term, and the interaction between 
them. More information and factual, longitudinal experience will be necessary for an in-depth 
and conclusive analysis. What follows may nevertheless be useful to inform policymaking 
and the public debate.  
2.3.1 Short term 
Sending countries with high unemployment can benefit directly, as illustrated above. The 
impact is less clear if unemployment is low and mobility is driven more by wage differences. 
A person employed prior to mobility creates an opening for someone unemployed. But if job 
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matching is difficult, for example because of low internal mobility, very specific skill 
demands or labour market institutions, the net benefit of sending countries may be reduced. 
The high unemployment figures linked to the other burdens created by the crisis make it 
plausible that southern member states, in particular Spain, Greece and Portugal, should benefit 
from outward mobility.  
Most studies (Dustmann et al. 2010; Vargas-Silva, 2013; Baas and Brücker, 2011, 
Ruist, 2014) find a positive effect for destination countries, both in terms of added economic 
growth and higher public income. The size of the benefit depends on factors such as the 
qualification and wage profiles of the workers, family composition and the cost of welfare 
entitlements. Immigrants can take on jobs no longer sought by nationals or increase 
competition in certain sectors, like construction, and their presence can affect wage formation 
(Kahanec, 2013, Blanchflower and Shadforth, 2009). Locally and regionally, they may add to 
the pressure on public services, schools and housing, however. So much has been said about 
‘welfare tourism’ that it deserves a special section in this report (see below).  
Overall, and contrary to perceptions in some countries, there is no evidence that 
mobility comes at a cost for a receiving member state. The overall picture shows a net benefit.  
2.3.2 Medium- to long-term effects 
In the long term, out-going workers deprive their home countries of taxes and social 
contributions. In addition, there is the brain-drain argument: the more skilled the mobile 
population, the greater the effect. At first sight, this appears to be detrimental to the sending 
country. How all this works out in practice depends, again, on a number of factors and the 
interaction between them – about which little is known. With persistent high unemployment, 
the issue is not only about contributing at home versus contributing abroad. The overall 
outcome also depends on how far public expenditure can be cut; on the quality of education 
and training systems preparing new worker cohorts; on the degree of cohesion between social 
partners; the state’s capacity to introduce structural reform; and the benefits of returning 
mobile workers trained abroad, even after a longer period, etc.  
What matters for receiving countries is the difference between how the costs and 
benefits evolve over the longer term. Here, the worker’s age on arrival and the ultimate 
duration of his/her stay gain in importance. The call on benefits is likely to increase for older 
workers and can be disproportionate to their contributions if they arrived late in their career. 
Although it may be too early to draw longer-term conclusions, the evidence so far shows no 
excessive public benefits or services uptake by mobile EU workers relative to nationals 
(GHK, 2013), even if in the UK their claims may be rising faster (Vargas-Silva, 2014).  
3. Moving for welfare benefits?  
A distinction should be made between social assistance and social security benefits. In 
general, social assistance is available for persons and dependants without the means or 
income to meet basic needs. Social security benefits cover a broader group of claims: for 
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example unemployment insurance, family allowance, child benefits, old-age pension, and 
sickness benefits.  
3.1 Social security coordination 
Social security benefits are coordinated among member states under Regulation 883/2004 
(European Council, 2004b) and subsequent amendments. The regulation gives clear 
guidelines as to which country’s social security system is responsible for mobile workers and 
their families. It ensures that mobile workers are covered by social security in at least one 
member state. By removing the risk of ‘falling between the stools’, coordination supports 
mobility. The regulation provides for the exportability of social security benefits and the 
aggregation of contribution periods and the resulting benefit entitlements.  
3.1.1 Exportability 
Exportability is a sound principle: one is entitled to benefits available where taxes and social 
contributions are paid. A case in point is child allowance, which is granted in the country of 
work and partly reflects the costs of raising children there. It is on this point that public debate 
has concentrated in some member states, fuelled by the suspicion that mobility is not 
primarily related to the search for employment but rather more to obtain higher allowances 
than those granted in the country of origin where family and children still reside. In reality, 
the benefits actually exported are limited. Germany exports less than 10% of child benefits to 
Romania and some 30% to Poland (Van Borstel, 2014). These statistics, and the absence of 
evidence of blatant abuse (Gerdes and Wadensjö, 2013; BMI and BMAS, 2014), indicate that 
there is no need to change the basic principle of exportability within Regulation 883/2004.  
Nevertheless, exportability has become a hot political issue and makes headlines that 
undermine the support for mobility in some member states. Monitoring the development of 
exportability, in close cooperation between the Commission and member states and informing 
the debate with reliable and recent information, is therefore essential. It must also ensure that 
the paying authority can be confident that all relevant conditions for receiving the benefit are 
met. 
Proposals for changes to Regulation 883/2004 that have emerged in the public debate must be 
given careful attention.
10
 Among these are calls for the indexation of exported benefits 
according to the cost of living in the worker’s country of origin if his/her family still resides 
there. But it is not clear if this principle can be applied in all member states, in particular those 
where benefits are part of the tax system. However, it is important that any re-opening of the 
Regulation – the result of many years of complex work and political compromise – do not 
produce new mobility barriers. Moreover, any indexation should apply in a non-
discriminatory way, i.e. also when benefits are exported to countries with higher costs of 
living.   
                                                 
10
 Tænketanken Europa (2014), BMI and BMAS (2014). 
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3.1.2 Aggregation  
The other main principle in Regulation 883/2004 is the principle of aggregation. This 
stipulates that the mobile worker’s rights to social security benefits must be based on all 
periods during which the worker was eligible, both in the country of origin and the country of 
present work.  
The aggregation principle ensures that rights are not ‘lost’ when moving to another country, 
and thereby removes a possible obstacle to mobility. However, its implementation has 
sparked new controversy. According to Regulation 883/2004, only earnings from the first day 
of employment in the new country of work should count towards calculating the benefits for 
the whole relevant period. The resulting amounts could be significantly higher than if actual 
earnings during the relevant period, including in the country of origin, had been taken into 
account. The criticism against this provision makes the point that these higher benefits are 
disproportionate to the lower contributions made in the country of origin and thus 
discriminate in favour of mobile workers relative to nationals.  
Again, proposed solutions (in this case the inclusion of actual earnings during the relevant 
period) must be examined very carefully – not only by weighing the risks of re-opening the 
regulation and introducing new barriers and discrimination. Any solution should indeed also 
apply to workers moving from higher to lower salary countries.  
3.2 Social assistance to economically inactive EU citizens 
Economically inactive persons moving to another member state must demonstrate that they 
are in possession of sufficient financial means to support themselves. In principle, as pointed 
out by the Commission, it is therefore unlikely that such persons apply for social assistance. 
Nevertheless, personal situations can change and the Citizens Directive makes clear that 
mobile individuals cannot automatically have their right to residence withdrawn as a 
consequence of applying for social assistance. Each case has to be evaluated on its own 
merits.  
In practice, it is not clear how far the concept of ‘unreasonable burden’ stretches and under 
what circumstances economically inactive EU citizens can gain access to social assistance 
(Minderhoud, 2009). These are questions on which the much anticipated ruling of the 
European Court of Justice in the so-called Dano-case should provide further clarity.
11
  
3.3 Conclusions and recommendations 
Mobility is good for the EU as a whole and indispensable for the proper functioning of the 
Internal Market. In the short term member states should gain as well. The long-term 
advantages and disadvantages for individual member states are not easy to assess and require 
                                                 
11
 Mrs. Dano, a Romanian woman living in Leipzig (Germany), had applied for social benefits to cover 
subsistence needs but had been rejected on the ground that she had not been actively looking for a job in 
Germany, and had never worked in Germany or Romania before. She had lived in Germany for two years, 
provided for by her sibling. The case was transferred to the European Court of Justice where Advocate General 
Melchior Wathelet in his Opinion upheld Germany’s ruling (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2014). 
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much more knowledge and research (see “need for better data”, chapter I), in particular as to 
how mobility interacts with the design of the welfare state.  
Although small, the stabilisation effect on the labour market for countries with high 
unemployment should be positive.  
EU legislation that has caused controversy should be reviewed and changed if necessary. 
Serious attention should also be given to objections, even if not based on concrete evidence, 
for example in the case for ‘benefit tourism’, the exportability of social benefits, the 
aggregation of working periods and social assistance. The European Commission must be 
seen to address widespread anxiety, if only to be ‘ahead of the curve’ or to prove it unjustified 
should real problems arise. In all matters relating to mobility, the political debate has 
confirmed the justification of the caveat: economic insignificance does not rule out public 
controversy. 
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III. How to Promote Labour Mobility  
This chapter discusses actual and possible measures to overcome barriers and to promote 
mobility. It is supplemented by chapter 4 “The German Experiment” on local and regional 
recruitment projects.  
1. EURES: Better matching and information 
The system to coordinate the exchange of vacancies among public employment services in 
member states, EURES, dates back to 1993. EURES is coordinated by the Commission with a 
range of partners, including social partners and universities. The aim of the network is to 
provide information, advice and cross-border matching services to employers and potentially 
mobile workers The EURES network is based on two pillars. The first, and arguably the most 
important, is the network of more than 850 EURES advisors. They are placed within public 
employment services or partner organisations and have a good knowledge of the challenges of 
applying for, and taking up job opportunities in another member state.  
The second pillar is the online portal collecting vacancies forwarded by public 
employment services or EURES partner organisations. Vacancies are mostly available in 
national languages, although companies can publish jobs in other languages, for instance if 
they wish to target jobseekers in a particular country. Not all member states’ public 
employment services are linked to the EURES portal, and not all vacancies from those that 
are linked are forwarded. The online portal covered between 30% and 40% of all vacancies in 
the EU in 2012 (European Commission, 2012b).  
Until recently the EURES portal received little attention, and its initial regulatory 
framework remained largely unchanged. How much added value the portal has brought is 
open to question. A total of 80% of all vacancies came from just two countries: Germany and 
the UK (EJMB, 2014). Only 12% of Europeans had heard about EURES in 2010 and 2% had 
actively used it, even though one-in-five Europeans could see themselves working outside 
their own country (Eurobarometer, 2010).  
The Commission has recently issued a new proposal for regulation of the EURES 
system (European Commission, 2014b). The proposal follows up on the conclusions of the 
2012 June Council and initiatives launched as part of the 2013 EU Citizenship report and the 
Commission’s Communication “Free movement of EU citizens and their families: five 
actions to make a difference”. The new proposal lays the groundwork for full information for 
all jobseekers about job opportunities anywhere in the European Union, and assistance in 
understanding the consequences of taking up employment outside one’s home country. The 
proposal has the following elements: 
 Completeness: the EURES portal shall have a ‘nearly’ complete set of vacancies, 
accessible to every jobseeker, supplemented with a large pool of CVs from member states 
for registered employers to consult. 
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 Matching: CVs and vacancies shall be matched automatically across countries. This 
requires a complete translation system of all skills, competences and qualifications across 
member states and languages. Further development of the European system for the 
classification of skills, competences, qualifications and occupations (ESCO) will make 
this possible. 
 Information: public employment services and partners must make basic information 
about the EURES system available to any jobseeker or employer ‘seeking client services’. 
 Assistance: any client must be assisted with matching, placement and recruitment through 
the EURES system. 
 Labour market intelligence: public employment services and partners must exchange 
information on labour shortages and surpluses.  
A further novelty is that the EURES network will open up to many more potential 
partners, such as private employment services, employers’ organisations and trade unions. 
The Commission is breaking new ground in trying to achieve what is beyond the capacity of 
individual partners. Best practices and examples on how to structure the portal and automated 
matching are difficult to reproduce across borders, languages and methodical differences 
among participating partners. There are no easy fixes and the Commission has to fine-tune the 
system over time. SMEs become a focus point; they are ill equipped (especially those located 
outside large urban centres) for international recruitment. 
The many EURES users, employers and jobseekers give ample opportunity for 
experimentation  
o with the internet user interface 
o with a more task-based description of vacancies for low- and medium-skilled workers 
o with the sharing of vacancies on social media 
o by creating the possibility to ‘follow’ selected firms and receive notification of new 
vacancies 
o by improving the advanced search functions (clustering of firms, cross-search of 
professions and sectors) 
o by translating selected vacancies into languages with a known supply of workers 
o by facilitating contacts between current and former users who now have a job 
o by contributing to labour market intelligence based on online behaviour and 
preferences of firms and jobseekers 
o by increasing the visibility of EURES via national media 
2. Recognition of professional qualifications 
Employers are generally free to set job requirements. However, in the so-called regulated 
professions, certain qualifications are legally imposed. These professions differ across 
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member states but they usually include medical professions (40% of all regulated professions) 
along with architects, educators and the transport sector, for “overriding reasons of general 
interest”. Malpractice in these professions can cause direct harm to the customer that is not 
able to evaluate the service provided himself. The European Commission has set up a 
platform listing all regulated professions so that mobile workers can be aware of such 
requirements.
12
 Furthermore, Directive 2013/55/EU (European Council, 2013) amending the 
2005/36/EC (European Council, 2005b) Directive on the recognition of professional 
qualifications has facilitated the recognition procedures and future introduction of a European 
Professional Card.  
Overall, the recognition of qualifications is running smoothly across EU countries. On 
average, only 5% of applications were rejected between 2010 and 2013.  
Table 1. Recognition performance between 2010-2013 by country where qualification was 
obtained (only application within the EU) 
Country of origin 
(qualification obtained in) 
Decisions taken by 
host EU country 
Total positive Total negative Total neutral 
Austria 2,669 75% 1% 24% 
Belgium 3,633 85% 3% 12% 
Bulgaria 3,304 78% 5% 17% 
Croatia 44 98% 2% 0% 
Cyprus 281 67% 11% 22% 
Czech Republic 1,867 83% 2% 15% 
Denmark 1,916 89% 3% 8% 
Estonia 2,523 90% 1% 9% 
Finland 932 72% 3% 25% 
France 3,338 73% 8% 20% 
Germany 7,751 83% 5% 11% 
Greece 13,121 86% 9% 5% 
Hungary 4,653 83% 3% 14% 
Ireland 4,159 86% 8% 6% 
Italy 5,068 69% 5% 26% 
Latvia 745 77% 2% 21% 
Lithuania 1,240 71% 5% 23% 
Luxembourg 157 78% 6% 16% 
Malta 268 93% 1% 6% 
Netherlands 3,549 78% 4% 18% 
Poland 10,671 71% 7% 23% 
Portugal 3,548 90% 2% 9% 
Romania 13,877 83% 4% 12% 
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 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/regprof/  
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Slovakia 3,142 87% 2% 12% 
Slovenia 645 77% 7% 16% 
Spain 8,944 77% 3% 20% 
Sweden 2,005 86% 4% 10% 
United Kingdom 7,357 73% 11% 16% 
Total EU 111,407 80% 5% 15% 
Source: Own calculations based on Regulated professions database (2014).  
Even if success rates are high, slow procedures can still constitute a barrier to mobility. 
The European Commission should monitor the average time needed, set up benchmarks and 
keep track of improvements/best practice. Some member states, such as Germany, have 
already simplified and shortened the application process, including for third-country nationals 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2011). Partial recognition, to be complemented by a shortened 
additional education, should also be developed as much as possible.  
A Eurobarometer survey in 2014 found that 23% of European citizens expect 
recognition problems abroad (Eurobarometer, 2014). However, only 4% of people who 
actually moved experienced problems. This suggests that more work needs to be done to get 
the facts across. 
3. Portability of supplementary pension entitlements  
Supplementary pension entitlements are rarely, if at all, portable across country borders. In 
practice, this means that mobile workers risk losing part of acquired pension rights and may 
face long vesting periods to build up new rights. This is a strong disincentive to taking up 
work abroad.  
Progress was achieved with the European Parliament’s adoption of Directive 
2014/50/EU (European Council, 2014) on “the minimum requirements for enhancing worker 
mobility between Member States, improving the acquisition and preservation of 
supplementary pension rights”. The Directive concerns only labour-market pension schemes 
and thus not voluntary contributions made to individual pension schemes. Key measures 
include a maximum vesting period of three years and a minimum age of 21 from which 
contributions can be vested.  
In addition, an employee leaving a job to move abroad is entitled to get the value of 
pension entitlements paid out. The value of dormant pension rights (pension rights vested but 
without further accrual) should be safeguarded in a fair manner, similar to active pension 
contributions into the scheme. 
The directive is a helpful measure on an issue that is likely to gain in importance as 
member states place more emphasis on labour-market pensions in an attempt to secure 
adequate pension levels in the future.  
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4. Language  
Differences in language and culture among member states are arguably the biggest barriers to 
mobility (Nerb et al., 2009). They are also difficult to overcome, at least in the short term.  
Foreign language skills are important for mobility, even if they are not intrinsically part 
of the job. They facilitate contacts between employer and worker, and make integration and 
dealing with administrative issues easier (Chaloff and Lemaitre, 2009). Once the person is 
hired and has moved, he/she can learn to master the national language.  
Education policy in general, including foreign languages to feature on school curricula, 
lies entirely with member states. Recent years have seen a move to expose pupils to foreign 
languages at an increasingly early age. Many member states have opted for English as the first 
foreign language, with French, Spanish or German as the second foreign language. The EU’s 
emphasis must be on cultural diversity and multi-lingualism with the objective ‘mother 
tongue + two foreign languages’. But de facto, in line with global developments, English has 
become the leading foreign language in the EU.  
In terms of actual language proficiency, there are large differences among EU countries. 
The First European Survey on Language Competences did not cover all 28 member states but 
the results gave a good indication of the general spread of language skills (European 
Commission, 2011b). While Sweden and Estonia had, respectively, 75% and 60% of 
secondary pupils classed as independent users of the first foreign language (level B in the 
classification of EU language skills), only 27% in Spain and Portugal achieved this level. The 
findings are corroborated by the self-assessment of language skills carried out in the Adult 
Education Survey (Meyer et al., 2010). Improved language teaching and learning would bring 
EU citizens closer together and facilitate their mobility; it would also make the EU more 
attractive to third-country nationals, and increase international competitiveness, as 
acknowledged by the European Commission (European Commission, 2012). It would also 
foster integration within the EU.  
The Commission should push ahead with the ‘mother tongue + two foreign languages’ 
objective and the European Benchmark of Language Competences Initiative. All 28 member 
states should be included in the next European Survey on Language competences planned for 
2016, and funding should be made available for regular repeats of this survey. Given the 
increasingly important role of immigration and labour mobility, setting targets for foreign 
language proficiency – maybe as a sub-indicator to a new set of ‘Europe 2030 targets’ – is one 
way to ensure progress.  
5. Third-country nationals 
Much of the political debate in the EU focuses on migration from member states, and in 
particular from EU10. This should be put into perspective as considerable numbers of 
migrants come from outside the EU. Although less attractive than English-speaking 
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destinations such as the US or Canada, the EU has been a magnet for many non-EU 
foreigners, in many cases exceeding the number of EU immigrants (Figure 14). 
Figure 14. Immigration to EU15 by country of citizenship, 2010 
 
Source: Eurostat (2014).  
Third-country nationals residing in EU member states do not automatically have the mobility 
rights granted to EU citizens. Although small as a percentage in the overall EU population 
(4% in 2013), this group is likely to be more mobile than EU nationals. And their number is 
not insignificant: third-country nationals make up 60% of the group when combined with 
mobile EU nationals (Table 2). 
Table 2. EU and third country nationals living in the EU outside their country of birth 
 2013 
EU citizens living in an EU country other than their country of birth 13.6 Mio 
Third-country nationals living in the EU 20.3 Mio 
Source: Eurostat. 
The number of third-country nationals is likely to grow in years to come and some 
member states are starting to recruit them more actively. Net migration into the EU over the 
next ten years is projected to reach more than 6 million people (Eurostat, 2014). A re-
examination of the current rules and their possible relaxation is therefore justified, at least 
prospectively. It is clear from the following text that member states, even those that recognise 
the potential of third-country immigrants, are hesitant to introduce clear and more flexible 
rules for the EU as a whole. This puts the EU at a disadvantage in the global race for talent 
and may exact a price in terms of the Union’s competitiveness. The World Economic Forum 
competitiveness indicator clearly reflects the EU’s weakness in this domain. Under the 
heading “capacity to attract talent” the UK (4) and Luxembourg (8) are the only member 
states among the global top ten (WEF, 2014). 
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5.1 Rules guiding the intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals  
There are three categories of third-country nationals for whom rules regarding intra-EU 
mobility apply: long-term residents, students and researchers, and Blue Card holders. For 
third-country nationals residing in one member state and not falling into any of these 
categories, no specific rules apply when they wish to become residents in another member 
state. They must go through the same procedures as any third-country national. 
5.1.1 Long-term residents 
Third-country residents are entitled to move to another (‘second’) member state once they 
obtain a long-term resident status under Directive 2003/109/EC (European Council, 2003). To 
be eligible for long-term residence third-country nationals must have resided lawfully and 
continuously in a member state for at least five years immediately prior to applying, and be in 
possession of stable and sufficient resources. Long-term resident status brings with it several 
rights, including intra-EU mobility for the purpose of work or training.  
However, they still encounter a number of obstacles. The directive is not well 
implemented in many member states, according to a Commission assessment in 2011 
(European Commission, 2011c). Differences in, or lack of, implementation are perhaps most 
tellingly borne out by the fact that long-term residents in Germany made up little more than 
6,000 individuals by the end of 2012. By comparison, Austria had granted around 200,000 
long-term resident permits. According to official statistics, France is not issuing any long-
term residence permits at all.
13
 Furthermore, the scope of Directive 2003/109/EC does not 
extend to students, potentially limiting the mobility of third-country nationals with a tertiary 
education obtained in a member state. 
Many countries create an additional obstacle by applying a so-called labour market test, 
requiring evidence that a given position cannot be filled by nationals or EU/EFTA citizens. 
Responsibility for providing this evidence falls onto public employment services and 
companies (EMN, 2013). Further restrictions apply to self-employed workers. 
5.1.2 Blue Card holders 
The 2009 Blue Card Directive was meant to be a cornerstone in the strategy to make the EU 
more attractive to high-skilled workers from third countries. Its fragmented application stands 
in the way of achieving this objective. The directive allows member states to apply national 
rules, which do not necessarily confer any rights of movement within the EU (Eisele, 2013; 
Wiesbrock, 2010). Member states have significant discretion in defining delivery criteria for 
the Blue Card (e.g. earnings threshold, education, quotas etc.) or in recognising the right of 
residence in a second EU country on the basis of a Blue Card delivered earlier in another 
member state.  
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 Eurostat, table named migr_reslong.  
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In a possible future opening of the directive, a Blue Card issued to certain professions, say 
engineers, should be made valid for the EU as a whole and not for a particular member state. 
If necessary, this could be combined with transparent rules for minimum salary levels. 
5.1.3 Students and researchers 
Intra-EU mobility rights of third-country students and researchers are currently laid out in the 
Students and Researchers Directives (European Council, 2004, respectively European 
Council, 2005). They give some preference to short-term mobility (less than three months to 
pursue research and study) and in the application for visa or resident permits for long-term 
stays in a second member state relative to a third-country national applying from outside EU 
territory.  
Issues of transposition into national law (European Commission, 2011d, 2011e) 
prompted the Commission to propose a Recast Directive in March 2013 with the aim of 
combining the two directives into one and harmonising their provisions (European 
Commission, 2013c). The proposal is now with the European Parliament.  
The Recast proposal offers the possibility for students and researchers to stay in the 
member state of arrival and seek work for a period of up to 12 months after finishing their 
studies or research, provided they have sufficient resources to support themselves. This 
innovation could provide a significant incentive to pursue higher education within the EU. 
Unfortunately, the clause may be weakened by the European Parliament. Its Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, wishes to change a “Member States shall’ to 
“Member States may”, opening the door to the same fragmented implementation experienced 
with the Blue Card (Eisele, 2013).  
The Commission should hold on to the main elements of its proposal. A compromise 
with the European Parliament and member states could limit this right to graduates of certain 
subjects in high demand. Graduates and researchers should also be allowed to seek 
employment throughout the EU, for instance by introducing a mobility card allowing them a 
certain period of residence within the Union subsequent to graduation from a European 
university (Busse and Moorehouse, 2014). 
6. Findings and recommendations 
EURES is a valuable tool but not up to date and relatively unknown. The planned upgrade is 
welcome, but keeping the system relevant for jobseekers and SMEs requires continuous effort 
and a lot of experimentation with the online platform and with how best to match jobs and 
skills across borders. 
There is little evidence that recognition of foreign qualifications is a major obstacle to 
mobility. The acceptance rate is high, which contradicts public perceptions. More work is 
required to communicate the facts to the public, also on where to find help should problems 
arise, such as Solvit and national contact points. As slow procedures can discourage mobility, 
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the European Commission should set up duration benchmarks and monitor improvements and 
best practice. 
Second language proficiency is still low in many member states. The Commission 
must push ahead with the strategy ‘mother tongue + two foreign languages’, include all 
member states’ periodical surveys and consider the introduction of targets. Obstacles to the 
mobility of third-country nationals abound, putting the EU at a disadvantage in the 
international competition for new skills and talents. Nevertheless, member states show little 
appetite to give full implementation of (optional) EU facilities for long-term residents, Blue 
Card holders, students and researchers. The Commission should strive to improve existing 
directives and avoid watering down its proposal for students and researchers. 
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IV. The German Experiment 
This chapter analyses a new recruitment strategy to help German SMEs fill vacancies with 
foreign workers and apprentices. Why focus on Germany? The country has an unemployment 
rate of a mere 5.3%; a historical low since German unification. In Baden-Württemberg and 
Bavaria unemployment rates have even sunk below 4% (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2014b). 
Germany also has the highest number of vacancies within the EU (almost one million in 
2012) and a negative demographic outlook, necessitating new ways of finding talents and 
skills abroad. A variety of pilot projects set up to this end can serve as best practice examples 
for other member states and provide links with EU efforts to promote mobility. 
German ministries have responded with a Fachkräfte-Offensive/Strategie (a novel 
dictum roughly translating as “qualified worker offensive/strategy”) to countervail labour 
shortages now and in years to come (German ministry for economic affairs and energy, 2014). 
The initiative emphasises the importance of Germany’s high quality education (e.g. dual 
education), the need for better matching and the activation of female workers and older 
workers, but also the need to attract highly skilled foreign workers.  
In their search for foreign labour, large employers do not limit themselves to platforms 
offered by employment agencies, linked through EURES. They use their networks and 
foreign subsidiaries, place advertisements on their own websites and in local media, 
participate in job fairs and benefit from their reputation and attractiveness as well as their 
links to universities and alumni networks. With their economies of size they can also take the 
risk of recruitment failure. 
These options are rarely available for SMEs. To support them, chambers of commerce, 
business associations and, in some cases, local governments decided to pool forces and set up 
a project-based foreign recruitment programme for local SMEs. Most of these projects 
focused on Spain. Spanish is often taught in German schools, facilitating communication with 
recruits, at least at a basic level. Spanish workers are also thought to have a positive work 
ethic and Spanish school and vocational training systems are quite similar to those in 
Germany. In addition, ties between local governments and ‘partner cities’ in Spain facilitated 
contacts.  
1. Local and regional projects 
Launched from 2009 (Figure 15) without specific official funding, projects collected 
vacancies and advertised them on their websites and networks; the Suhl-project
14
 was one 
such example, with a large pool of applicants. Others integrated Spanish counterparts or the 
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 Recruitment initiatives led by the chamber of commerce in Suhl that targeted the Spanish labour market. 
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Auslandshandelskammer
15
 to ensure that the vacancies were properly advertised in Spain and 
that guidance could be provided in Spain.  
The projects generally had three objectives: 
 Spread information in Spain about the vacancies, the regions and Germany; 
 Build trust, for example in the quality of jobs/apprenticeships offered; 
 Offer a one-stop-shop ‘carefree’ package 
Following considerable media attention and exchanges of experience, other German 
regions launched their own projects in 2012. Minor conducted a survey of 306 projects by 
2013, having contacted 400 project managers (Pfeffer-Hoffmann, 2014).  
Figure 16. German recruitment projects by start-year 
 
Source: Minor (2014). 
Gradually, the conditions for project success became visible: Partnerships: involving a 
partner in Spain to recruit and advertise was found to be essential to reach a maximum 
number of candidates, including by tapping directly into the talent pool of universities and 
schools. The Spanish partner also served to reassure participants that the projects are sound 
and serious and to dispel doubts and manage expectations.  
Selection process: Employers assessed the candidates themselves or the pre-selection 
was done on their behalf by project staff or a private recruitment agency. Face-to-face job 
interviews in Spain or even job fairs were effective, but costly. Interviews via Skype were 
cheap but received mixed reviews.  
 Language requirements: Projects mostly targeted young jobseekers, especially for 
apprenticeships and traineeships in sectors with the greatest labour shortage: medical, health 
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and technical professions, tourism and construction. Language requirements varied. Most 
employers were seeking a minimum of A2 to B2 (intermediate levels) while others put greater 
value on work experience or motivation and even accepted applicants without German 
language skills. As few Spaniards have German lessons at school, projects sponsored German 
courses in Spain before departure, usually lasting three months.  
Additional German courses: During internship candidates attended additional German 
courses, sometimes geared towards the specific vocabulary of their workplace. Some courses 
offered online cut out the need to travel. Those well prepared by preparatory classes attended 
in Spain ensured a smoother transition. 
Relocation support: Although expensive, a one-stop-shop offering assistance with 
planning, travel, accommodation and official administration was found to be most helpful for 
recruitment success with young, mostly inexperienced candidates. The package gave them a 
sense of security and allowed them to focus on professional and language skills. 
Trial period: Half the projects surveyed by Minor opted for a three-month internship 
trial period to test the candidates’ capacity to adapt and integrate into new cultural, linguistic 
and workplace surroundings. Internships during the summer break have the advantage, if 
successful, to tie in with the start of the normal vocational school year. According to Minor, 
nearly 80% of internships were paid, usually at around €500 per month.  
Integration: The following considerations were seen as helpful to further integration of 
the interns: diminish the risk of culture shock by recruiting from towns of a similar size as the 
workplace; decrease the likelihood of homesickness by recruiting couples, or a group of 
Spaniards for the same region; assist with everyday problems by appointing a “Kümmerer”, a 
carer or guide, ideally with sufficient knowledge of Spanish; organise ‘buddy’ programmes: 
leisure activities and excursions with fellow Spaniards – particularly important in more 
remote areas. 
Depending on the size of the project, their location and existing networks, operational 
differences are still considerable. Some elements have now become standard and are the 
backbone of most projects. Their long-term success rate remains hard to assess but they did 
succeed in attracting workers into shortage professions, albeit at a considerable cost in terms 
of money (see below under MobiPro), time and effort.  
2. National support schemes 
The word “Willkommenskultur” – literally translated as “welcome culture” – sums up German 
efforts to attract foreign labour from third countries and other EU member states. Welcome 
Centres were established in major cities and under the ‘jobofmylife’ initiative, launched by the 
German government with the German employment agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit), the 
portal “Make-it-in-Germany” offered information on, and easy access to, vacancies for 
interested foreign workers. 
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This initiative is connected to the MobiPro-EU support programme launched in 2013 by 
the German government, in cooperation with several German stakeholders and the EURES 
system (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2014c). MobiPro tackles financial barriers to mobility by 
providing funding to apprentices and, in some cases, mobile workers. It also supports the 
local German recruitment programmes mentioned above.  
The stated aim of the MobiPro programme is to foster mobility in the EU with specific 
reference to the problems affecting the Spanish labour market. It targets Spanish apprentices
16
 
between 18-35 years old. Specifically excluding older workers may not be optimal, 
particularly with regard to skilled labour, where work experience is valued highly. The 
programme has been so successful that access is now limited to candidates who have 
completed an apprenticeship or master programme; young skilled workers, previously also 
supported, are now excluded (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 2014).  
MobiPro funding covers language courses in the sending country and during internship 
as well as remedial vocational school training. Travel and relocation allowances vary from 
€300 to €500, including for the return flight if apprenticeship is not completed. The largest 
item is the financial subsistence support granted to apprentices during their entire training, 
which usually lasts three years.  
MobiPro’s duration, initially set from 2013 to 2016, was extended to 2018 due to its 
success and positive media response. Total funding was raised from 139 million to 560 
million – averaging 93 million per year (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 2014). 
Demand by far outpaced expectations. As early as in April 2014 the German government had 
to stop applications after funding had been exhausted. Nearly 5,000 applications were 
approved for 2014. Initial earmarking of 48 million is expected to be overtaken by expenses 
closer to 100 million. Consequently, the number of apprentices for 2015 has been limited to 
2,000 (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 2014). 
Total investment per apprentice will most likely exceed €20,000. 17  This would 
constitute a substantial burden for any company considering setting up a similar recruitment 
framework on their own.  
In 2013, 63% of approved applications came from Spain and a similar distribution is 
expected for 2014. Mobi-Pro had a sizeable impact on immigration from Spain. According to 
social insurance statistics, Spanish participants under MobiPro-EU (near 2,600) constitute 
almost 30% of all new Spanish ‘workers’ in Germany.  
Overall, the programme has been a success, at least in its uptake; statistics on Spaniards 
staying for the entire three-year apprenticeship are not yet available. The programme will give 
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 Labour Ministers Fátima Bánez Garcia and Ursula von der Leyen brokered the deal in spring 2013, aiming to 
fill 5,000 positions with Spanish workers (Deutsche Welle, 2013). 
17 If the uptake of applicants does not exceed 2,000 in the years 2016-18, then the available funds per apprentice 
would even reach €29,000. 
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Germany and its companies valuable experience in recruitment abroad and, if successful, has 
a good chance of keeping trained labour longer term or even permanently in the country. The 
cost per apprentice is high but will be outweighed by the overall benefit in terms of growth, 
employment and competitiveness. The decisive question is this: will they stay?  
3. What role for the EU? 
The MobiPro programme received European visibility through EURES, which can serve as a 
forum for showcasing projects and transmitting valuable lessons and advice. Practical 
experience, positive and negative, can help other member states and stakeholders considering 
similar plans to find the most cost-effective route. 
The strength of the German experience lies in a bottom-up approach at local and 
regional level, supported by a national programme tailored to the specific labour-market needs 
of the country. There is no reason to believe that the EU could do a better job. However, the 
possibilities to benefit from contributions from the EU’s regional and social funds, which both 
promote employment and inclusion, merit careful examination. 
4. Findings and recommendations 
The German local and regional bottom-up approach, supported by national financial support, 
has been successful in supporting SME for recruitment abroad. It can serve as a best practice 
meriting wide publicity among member states, for example with the help of EURES. Specific 
EU financing does not seem justified but the possibility to call on the European regional and 
social funds in support of employment and inclusion should be further examined and utilised.  
Local recruitment projects should remain locally managed, which has proven to be the 
most efficient method. National public financial support should be encouraged. However, the 
EU should not aim to raise financial resources in the form of a mobility fund, but instead 
focus on its efforts within the European Social Fund. 
The European institutions should closely evaluate the experiences in Germany and 
draw conclusions for third-country national recruitment, in future, build on these experiences 
and EU efforts to attract talent from abroad could be financed by EU funds.  
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V. Overview: Findings and Recommendations 
Labour mobility is important for the European Union and free movement is widely seen as 
one of the great benefits of the EU. Evidence suggests that there is currently too little mobility 
within the Union – in particular within the eurozone. High unemployment in the south of 
Europe coexists with a high unmet demand for labour in the north. This disparity is not being 
resolved by limited labour mobility and there is no indication that this situation is about to 
change substantially. 
Arguments in favour of increased mobility are, however, often drowned out by a 
general fear, often amplified by the media in some western European countries, that too many 
workers from eastern Europe are moving in search of generous welfare benefits. There is no 
indication that this is the case, however. There may be local problems and rare individual 
cases, but these should not overshadow the overall benefits to the EU of greater mobility. But 
public opinion cannot and should not be ignored; either by members states or by the European 
Commission. The Commission must be ready to defend current legislation and to play a 
constructive role should evidence of systematic abuse, fraud or unintended consequences 
emerge. Importantly, the Commission is the best bulwark against new barriers to mobility 
being set up in this process. 
There are also concerns related to the long-term sustainability of emigration for sending 
countries. 
In order to address these issues and concerns there is a need for: 
 A European Mobility Working Group, preferably one situated within existing 
formations involving national and European institutions.  
As regards current barriers to mobility, the Commission still has much work to do with 
its EURES system. The online portal showing vacancies and CVs should be substantively 
upgraded, with a focus on accommodating SMEs. This will require continuous 
experimentation and evaluation. Recognition of foreign qualifications can perhaps be more 
streamlined and efficient, but few individuals have their applications for recognition rejected.  
 Creating more awareness of instruments to handle problems in this area should be a 
priority, such as Solvit and national contact points.    
Member states experiencing persistent labour shortages can learn from the numerous 
local projects that are primarily aimed at recruitment from Spain and currently run in 
Germany. The main lesson, perhaps, is that it is a difficult and expensive process. It is too 
early to say if this approach is cost effective and can be scaled. Prospectively, foreign 
recruitment is likely to play a greater role for many EU countries.  
 Mutual learning of best practices in foreign recruitment is beneficial. A framework 
in the spirit of the open method of coordination, perhaps within EURES, should 
facilitate this valuable exchange.  
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Taking a longer-term view, language proficiency is central to a common European 
labour market and to international competitiveness. English is now the de facto second 
language in the EU. However, levels of proficiency vary enormously across member states. 
 The Commission must push ahead with the strategy of ‘mother tongue + two 
foreign languages’, include all member states in periodical surveys of language 
competences and consider the introduction of targets.    
Rules governing the mobility of third-country nationals should be relaxed to make the 
EU more attractive to talented individuals.  
 The Commission should strive to make improvements in existing directives; a prime 
candidate being the Recast Directive combining the students and researchers 
directives. A good start would be to avoiding watering down, in the negotiating 
process, the provision allowing students and researchers to seek employment in the 
EU for an extended period. 
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